Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs, as unprofitable workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, or may be induced to accept one that they would otherwise reject with a negotiated severance package. We formalise those mechanisms within an extension of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model that allows for employed job search. We find that our model explains why higher firing costs intensify job-to-job turnover at the expense of transitions out of unemployment and that ignoring on-the-job search leads one to overstate the adverse impact of firing costs on employment.
Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape firing costs. While the primary effect of firing costs is to induce firms to keep employees in unprofitable matches, such unprofitable employees may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, thus sparing their incumbent employer the firing costs. Furthermore, employers can induce their unprofitable workers to accept outside job offers that they would otherwise reject by offering voluntary severance packages, which are less costly than the full statutory dismissal cost. We formalise those mechanisms within an extension of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994 ) that allows for employed job search and negotiation over severance packages.
The impact of firing costs on labour market equilibrium has been an object of keen study in the search and matching literature (see the review in Pissarides, 1999, or more recently Ljungqvist, 2002) . Firing costs are typically found to discourage both job destruction and job creation, thereby substantially reducing both unemployment outflows and inflows with a resulting effect on the equilibrium unemployment rate which is ambiguously signed and quantitatively negligible.
1 While several empirical contributions find a small or insignificant impact of the strictness of employment protection legislation on the unemployment rate in various contexts, the empirical literature is, overall, somewhat inconclusive and emphasises the sensitivity of the estimated impact of firing costs on unemployment to the data and specification used (Nickell, 1997; OECD, 1999; Blanchard and Portugal, 2000; Kahn, 2010 ).
Yet that large body of research consistently ignores direct job-to-job flows. Job-to-job flows are quantitatively substantial, amounting to between a third and a half of total labour reallocation and relevant to the issue of firing costs as a worker who quits a job spontaneously is usually not entitled to any redundancy payment and does not make the firm liable to a firing tax. We thus propose to introduce employed job search in a DMP-type model with firing costs and a minimum wage (the role of which we will discuss shortly). We show that the presence of employed job search strongly affects the response of unemployment flow rates and the unemployment rate to increases in firing costs when the minimum wage is not too low. Specifically, we find that higher firing costs discourage job destruction to a much larger extent than they do in the DMP model without employed job search and, conversely, that employed job search largely cushions the adverse impact of firing costs on job creation. As a result, firing costs have a quantitatively sizeable negative impact on the unemployment rate in that model. The difference in the economy's behaviour brought about by on-the-job search is due to the fact that, as mentioned earlier, job-to-job turnover enables employers to avoid paying the statutory firing cost in some cases.
Aside from on-the-job search, our model has three important specific features. First, as an alternative to the conventional practice of applying the Nash solution, we assume that mutual consent is the basic principle governing wage (re)negotiation in continuing firm-worker matches. Specifically, under that assumption, the wage is only altered when one of the worker's or the firm's outside options becomes binding, in which case the wage is revised up or down by just enough to satisfy whichever constraint is binding. It is an attractive assumption because it features in many labour contracts (Malcomson, 1997 , for empirical evidence), it delivers realistic wage dynamics (Postel-Vinay and Turon, 2010) , and it can be justified theoretically in different contexts (see the discussion in footnote 4 below and in Appendix A).
Second, as we show in the article, that assumption lends itself well to the analysis of endogenous severance packages, which arise naturally in the formal bargaining game that we use to deliver the wage determination rules just described. While not essential to the argument or main results of this article, severance packages are appealing for three reasons. First, this practice is observed to be used by employers aiming to reduce their workforce.
2 Second, it is difficult to rule them out theoretically in the context of a bargaining model like ours, other than by assuming that firms can somehow commit not to offer a severance package when it is in their interest to do so. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, allowing for severance packages actually simplifies the analysis: allowing for negotiated transfers at the point of separation forces firm-worker matches to fully internalise the future effects of current wage increases, which has the 2 Examples include the 'Mutually Agreed Resignation Scheme' put in place by employers affiliate with the UK National Health Service (NHS), whereby 'individual employees -in agreement with their employerchoose to leave their employment voluntarily, in return for payment' (http://www.nhsemployers.org/, July 2012). Other anecdotal evidence is the news item that Sunderland City Council (UK) is offering its staff up to a year's pay to quit (Sunderland Echo, July 2012). Other countries also use 'encouraged quits' as an alternative to simple layoffs. Hofer et al. (2011) analyse the impact of the 2003 reform of the Austrian severance pay legislation designed to encourage worker mobility from shrinking firms by allowing workers to keep their entitlement to severance pay if they quit. Morin and Vicens (2001) review redundancy practices in Europe and report a widespread practice in France and Germany of helping dismissed workers to find alternative employment by way of training schemes and compensation.
consequence that the joint value (to the firm-worker pair) of any match is independent of the way that this value is split (i.e. is independent of the wage). We discuss this important property in the main text.
The third distinguishing feature of our model is, as already mentioned, the presence of a minimum wage. We introduce a minimum wage for two reasons. First, studying the combined impact of firing costs and the minimum wage -two of the most common ingredients of labour market regulation in OECD economies -is an interesting exercise in its own right (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 1999; Boeri and Burda, 2009; Silva, 2010) . Second, although so far we have put the emphasis on employers offering their workers severance packages to induce them to quit into alternative jobs, in certain circumstances severance packages may also be used by employers as a means of inducing their workers to quit into unemployment (as opposed to firing them and incurring the firing cost). As first shown by Fella (2007) and confirmed in this article, if employers are allowed to offer severance packages to induce quits into unemployment, then some form of wage rigidity is required for firing costs to have any impact at all on job flows and unemployment. Intuitively, Fella (2007) shows that, if the firing cost is paid by the firm to a third party (tax, red-tape cost ...), it is always in the joint interest of the firm-worker match to avoid paying that tax by agreeing on a voluntary separation in which, rather than paying the firing cost (which would then be lost for the match), the firm offers the worker a voluntary severance package equal to the worker's foregone surplus from employment. In doing so, the firm effectively turns the firing tax into a transfer to the worker: the distinction between redundancy tax and transfer is rendered ineffectual by severance packages. As is well known (at least since Lazear, 1990) , in the absence of wage rigidity, firing restrictions in the form of firmworker transfers can be completely offset by contracts between risk-neutral employers and employees. Fella's (2007) contribution is to show that firing taxes can also be offset as long as risk-neutral employers and employees are able to negotiate sidepayments (severance packages) to induce workers to quit into unemployment without incurring the firing tax. This result no longer holds, however, in the presence of a source of wage rigidity such as an institutional wage floor. We will see that in our model, as in Fella's, the economy finds itself in two very different regimes regarding the effectiveness of firing costs depending on whether the minimum wage is binding at the point of job destruction.
The rest of this article is organised as follows. Our model is described in Section 1 and its solution with exogenous contact rates is discussed in Section 2. The characterisation of the full model solution, i.e. with endogenous contact rates is presented in Section 3. A calibration and simulation illustration is carried out in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
1.1. The Environment 1.1.1. Technology We take up all basic assumptions about the workings of the product and labour markets from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , from which we only depart by allowing employed workers to search on-the-job. The labour market thus features a unit mass of workers facing a continuum of identical firms producing a unique multi-purpose good sold in a perfectly competitive product market. Workers and firms are infinitely lived, forward-looking, risk-neutral and have a common exogenous discount rate of q. Time is continuous and the economy is in steady state.
Workers can either be unemployed or matched with a firm. Firms and workers are matched through a time-consuming search process, modelled in the following conventional way: unemployed (employed) workers receive job offers at a Poisson rate k 0 (k 1 ). We thus assume that all workers search for a (better) job and that their search intensity, although exogenous, depends on their employment status. We should note from the outset that not all offers are conducive to an actual match: workers will only accept an offer whenever it yields greater value than what they enjoy in their current state (more details on this below). Finally, note that we are treating the offer arrival rates k 0 and k 1 as exogenous parameters for the time being. We shall endogenise them later in the analysis by means of a matching function.
Firms operate a constant-return technology and are modelled as a collection of job slots which can either be vacant or occupied and producing. The quality of worker-firm matches is heterogeneous and subject to shocks. We define the output flow of a match as z, which represents a match-specific productivity, comprised in [0, 1] and subject to shocks (we omit the usual aggregate productivity index without loss of generality). The (Poisson) arrival rate of shocks to match productivity is denoted d and the post-shock value of z (z 0 , say) is drawn from a continuous distribution F(Á) over [0,1] (a normalisation), independently of the pre-shock value of z.
3 Shocks are also uncorrelated across matches. Finally, following standard practice, we assume that all new matches start out with the highest level of productivity, z ¼ 1 (more on this below). Then, like the conventional DMP model, our model features endogenous job destruction: upon drawing a productivity shock below a certain threshold (to be formally defined below), the firm will want to end the employment relationship.
Institutions
One of the objectives of this article is to analyse the combined impact of firing costs and the minimum wage on labour market equilibrium. We thus assume that firms are required to pay all their employees a wage greater than the institutional wage floor w min and are liable to a firing cost of T payable upon laying off a worker. It is important to stress that statutory dismissal costs are only applicable to employer-initiated separations to which the worker does not consent.
T and w min are exogenous policy parameters. In line with much of the literature, it may be easiest in the rest of this article to think of T as either a firing tax or as red tape costs, i.e. as a third-party payment which is a net loss to the firm-worker match rather than a statutory transfer paid by the firm to the worker upon separation. However, given our wage determination rule, that distinction has no bearing on the impact of T on equilibrium job flows and unemployment (it only affects the distribution of payoffs). Formal details are given in Appendix A.
The Employment Relationship
1.2.1. Notation and working assumptions Considering a firm-worker match with a current idiosyncratic productivity level of z, we denote the wage flow paid in this match by w and define J(z,w) (E(z,w)) as the value of this match to the firm (to the worker). We also introduce the total (gross) match value: V(z) ¼ J(z,w) + E(z,w). We justify below that this value is independent of the wage paid. Finally, we denote the worker's lifetime value of unemployment as U and assume that the firm's valuation of a vacant job is zero, as results from free entry on the search market (see below).
We start working under the following set of hypotheses about the impact of wages and productivity on the various value functions: @J/@z > 0, @J/@w < 0, @E/@w > 0, V 0 ðzÞ [ 0. All of those hypotheses will be formally confirmed later in the analysis.
We also assume that there are gains to trade on the labour market. More precisely, workers and employers are both willing to consummate a match with the maximum productivity level z ¼ 1 and a minimum wage of w min , i.e. formally Eð1; w min Þ ! U and J ð1; w min Þ ! 0.
We now introduce an additional series of definitions for future use. We first define R 0 ðwÞ, the value of productivity at which, given a wage of w, the firm's valuation of the match is zero, by J ½R 0 ðwÞ; w ¼ 0. Note that, because of layoff costs, this is not the productivity at which the firm decides to terminate the employment relationship. We further denote by w 0 ðzÞ the inverse of R 0 ðÁÞ, i.e. the maximum wage that a firm can pay without incurring a loss (in expected present value terms) given a current productivity level of z. We can then mutatis mutandis define the threshold productivity R T ðwÞ as the solution to J ½R T ðwÞ; w ¼ À T and the inverse w T ðzÞ of the function R T ðÁÞ. R T ðÁÞ gives the cutoff productivity value below which the firm is better off firing the worker (thus incurring the layoff cost T) than retaining her/him at the wage w. Our assumptions about the monotonicity of J(Á) with respect to both of its arguments ensure the consistency of all these definitions.
Wage determination
Our wage determination mechanism builds on Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a, b) and Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010) . Wages are set by firms. Workers, however, can use market pressure to extract some rent. Indeed they will use outside job offers to obtain wage increases by playing off potential employers against one another, as detailed in the following paragraphs. The principle governing all wage renegotiations is that of mutual consent. That is, either party can only force wage renegotiation to their advantage if the value of their outside option exceeds their current value in the match, giving them a credible threat to leave the match. When renegotiation does take place, the wage is adjusted up or down so as to give the forcing party the exact value of their outside option. 4 In the presence of firing costs, the value of the firm's outside option is the value of a vacant job, i.e. zero, less the firing cost T. Since quits are not legally liable for statutory dismissal costs, the worker's outside option is either the value of unemployment or the value of his/her outside job offer, if any.
Severance packages
The most immediate effect of employment protection is to induce firms to keep employees even when a negative productivity shock leads them to incur losses (up to the level of the firing cost) in the current match. Under the mutual consent rule, as long as these losses are less than the amount the firm would have to pay to fire the worker, the firm has no credible threat to dissolve the match and cannot force the worker to renegotiate the wage downwards.
Thus an obvious, however little explored consequence of the enforcement of statutory redundancy pay is that it leads firms and workers to negotiate severance packages aimed at encouraging the worker to leave when the firm is currently incurring losses. For example, in the event of an outside offer arising, the incumbent employer is willing to compensate the worker for him/her to accept it, up to the level of the current losses. Assuming that both worker and firm can observe the value of the outside offer, the incumbent firm will offer a severance package to the worker yielding him/her a value of quitting with this offer and this severance package marginally greater than the value of staying with his/her incumbent employer.
Depending on parameter values, severance packages can just as well arise at the firing margin (Fella, 2007) . We shall see below that, for given values of the minimum wage and unemployment income, as the firing cost T is increased, it may become both feasible and beneficial for employers to induce workers to quit into unemployment upon being hit by a sufficiently adverse productivity shock. Depending on whether this is the case or not, the impact of job security provisions on the equilibrium layoff rate will be very different.
Outside Offers
Given a current wage of w and a current productivity level of z, we denote the continuation values of the match to the firm (the worker) after an outside offer as J o ðz; wÞ ( E o ðz; wÞ). When an employed worker is contacted by an outside firm, we assume the sequence of events to be the following. The outside firm gets one chance to make the worker an offer, in the knowledge of current match productivity in the incumbent firm. A bargaining game is then played between the worker and the incumbent employer, in which the latter has an opportunity to raise the worker's wage, to offer a severance package or to do nothing, letting the worker either stay in the match with the existing wage, or quit to the poaching firm. Details of a specific strategic game are given in Appendix A and we only give an intuitive description of the bargain in the main text.
Denote the value to the worker of the outside offer by E 0 . Because all new matches start out with the maximum productivity level z ¼ 1, 5 the maximum worker's value of the outside offer is V(1), which is also the maximum value of employment as the worker is never able to claim a wage yielding a higher value than this, having no outside offer enabling him/her to do so. The minimum value of the outside offer is in turn constrained by the existence of a minimum wage to be Eð1; w min Þ. For future use, we denote by z m the value of the match productivity such that Eð1; w min Þ ¼ V ðz m Þ. So the boundaries of the worker's value of the outside offer are summarised as:
If the value of the outside offer is less than the worker's value of the current match, i.e. E 0 \ Eðz; wÞ, the worker will opt to stay with the current firm. If, however, the incumbent firm is incurring losses in this match, it will be in its best interest to offer a severance package to the worker to induce him/her to take up the outside offer. The minimum value required by the worker to do so is Eðz; wÞ À E 0 . The firm will find it profitable to offer this amount if it is lower than the current (negative) firm's value of the match. Note that the firm always has the option of firing the worker and pay the layoff premium of T, which therefore is an upper bound on the value of the severance package that the firm is willing to offer.
We first consider the case where the firm currently makes a profit, i.e. where z ! R 0 ðwÞ , w w 0 ðzÞ. Three situations may arise, depending on the value of z. First, if z ¼ 1, then the incumbent and the poaching firm are equally productive. The worker's value is then bid up to V(1), i.e. the worker extracts the whole surplus from either match. The worker then becomes indifferent between staying with her/his initial employer or taking up the poacher's offer and we assume s/he opts for the former (an innocuous assumption in our context). The continuation value of the initial match will hence be split into E o ½1; w 0 ð1Þ ¼ V ð1Þ to the worker and J o ½1; w 0 ð1Þ ¼ 0 to the incumbent employer. Second, if 1 [ z ! z m , the worker will leave the incumbent firm as the poacher now values the worker's employment more than the incumbent. When attempting to retain the worker, the incumbent firm will bid the wage up to a level yielding the worker a value of V(z), which is the maximum offer that the incumbent firm is willing to make. The outside firm (profitably) offers this value in order to bid the worker away from the incumbent. Hence in this case E o ðz; wÞ ¼ V ðzÞ and J o ðz; wÞ ¼ 0. Finally, if z \ z m , that maximum offer is less than the minimum offer that the poacher is allowed to make (because of minimum wage regulations), yielding the worker a value of Eð1; w min Þ ¼ V ðz m Þ. The worker then quits with a value of E o ðz; wÞ ¼ Eð1; w min Þ and the incumbent firm is left with a value of J o ðz; wÞ ¼ 0.
Let us now look at the case where the incumbent firm is currently incurring losses at the prevailing wage, i.e. J ðz; wÞ \ 0 , Eðz; wÞ [ V ðzÞ , z \ R 0 ðwÞ , w [ w 0 ðzÞ. As the worker is never able to raise his/her wage above w 0 ð1Þ, the firm cannot be making losses when the match productivity equals 1. If 1 [ z ! z m , the poacher will make a maximum offer yielding the worker a value of V(z), which is less than the current worker's value of the incumbent match, E(z,w), since the firm is making losses. So, as it stands, the worker would opt to stay with the incumbent firm. However, as this latter is incurring losses, it is in its interest to induce the worker to leave and it will do so by offering a severance package exactly compensating the worker for the difference between the offer and his/her current value of employment:
As a result, the worker quits her/his job with a continuation value of E o ðz; wÞ ¼ Eðz; wÞ, leaving her/his initial employer with a value of J o ðz; wÞ ¼ J ðz; wÞ \ 0. If z \ z m , the poacher's offer cannot be worth less than V ðz m Þ to the worker because of the binding minimum wage. If that is greater than the value the worker gets from the current match, s/he will leave spontaneously. If it is lower, the incumbent firm will offer a severance package of Eðz; wÞ À V ðz m Þ to induce him/her to leave. The worker thus leaves the initial match with a continuation value of E o ðz; wÞ ¼ max½Eðz; wÞ; V ðz m Þ, while the incumbent employer receives a continuation value of J o ðz; wÞ ¼ À max½Eðz; wÞ À V ðz m Þ; 0. Note that this is greater than J(z,w), so that the worker's receipt of an outside offer is a positive shock for the firm in this instance. Table 1 summarises the continuation values ð E o ; J o ; V o Þ for the worker, the incumbent firm and the match after an outside offer in all cases examined above.
Before we move on, a discussion of the simplifications brought about by severance packages is in order. As is clear from Table 1 , the continuation value of a match after an outside offer is independent of the wage prevailing before the occurrence of that offer. This is a direct consequence of the possibility of side payments at the point of separation. If we somehow ruled them out (e.g. by assuming that firms can commit ex ante never to offer a severance package in response to an outside job offer), then any poacher wanting to hire a worker whose incumbent employer is making a loss would 
have to offer the worker her/his full value E(z,w), as opposed to only V(z) (which is less than E(z,w) as the incumbent firm is making a loss). Therefore, the continuation value of the incumbent match following that outside offer would be E(z,w), a function of the wage. In words, ruling out severance packages would allow firm-worker matches to 'piggy-back' on future potential poachers, who, in expectation, would have to deliver part of the value E(z,w) owed to the worker in the initial match. By contrast, the possibility of negotiated severance packages at the point of separation forces firmworker matches to fully internalise the future effects of current wage raises. This, in turn, ensures that the value of a match is independent of the wage in that match, which simplifies the analysis greatly, as it implies that all that matters for the equilibrium allocation in this economy is the distribution of productivity across matches, not the joint distribution of productivity and wages.
Productivity Shocks and Wage Cuts
Like outside job offers, productivity shocks can prompt wage renegotiation. The rules for wage renegotiation after a productivity shock are the same as those following an outside job offer, i.e. they are based on mutual consent and the same bargaining game is played by the worker and the firm. Again, details of the game are confined to Appendix A and we only describe the bargain outcome in the main text. Because of the mutual consent rule, productivity shocks can only lead to downward wage revisions (or layoffs). Indeed a positive productivity shock does not affect the worker's outside option and therefore does not give her/him an opportunity to force her/his employer to accept a wage increase.
6 Now, not all productivity shocks will cause a wage cut: again, because of the mutual consent restriction, the productivity shock has to be bad enough that the firm is better off firing the worker (firing cost notwithstanding) than keeping her/him in employment at the current wage rate. This happens whenever the firm would incur losses greater than T under the current wage w and the new productivity draw z 0 (say), i.e. formally whenever z 0 \ R T ðwÞ. When this is the case, the wage is revised down to the point where the firm's outside option (to fire the worker) is met, i.e. to the point where the firm's valuation of the match given the new productivity value z 0 equals ÀT, the value of firing the worker. Formally, the renegotiated wage is set to w T ðz 0 Þ. Of course, it may happen that the minimum wage makes this legally impossible. For instance it may happen that the firm incurs losses greater than T, even when paying the minimum wage w min . In this case (which formally translates as z 0 \ R T ðw min Þ), the match is dissolved. Yet, the situation regarding match dissolution is further complicated by the possibility of negotiating severance packages. We now analyse the job destruction rule in detail. 6 We are taking a bit of a shortcut here. This statement is only true to the extent that the worker is never tempted to quit into unemployment. Given the minimum wage w min , this formally translates into assuming that Eðz; w min Þ ! U for all 'viable' values of z, i.e. values of z such that the match is not dissolved (more on this below). Were this not the case, firms would sometimes have to raise their worker's wage following an adverse productivity shock in order to keep them from quitting into unemployment. While this latter situation is undeniably a theoretical possibility, covered in the renegotiation game analysed in Appendix A, we regard it as factually implausible and rule it out in the main body of the article.
1.5. Job Destruction 1.5.1. Two regimes As argued above, if productivity falls short of R T ðw min Þ, then the firm is better off firing the worker and paying T than maintaining the match. As a result, any job drawing a productivity level below R T ðw min Þ will inevitably be destroyed. Whether or not jobs are maintained at all productivity levels above R T ðw min Þ depends on the worker's valuation of those jobs as we now explain.
First, if E½R T ðw min Þ; w min [ U þ T , then the worker strictly prefers employment at the minimum wage and any productivity level above R T ðw min Þ to being laid off with the maximum severance payment of T. In this case the firm can never profitably (i.e. at a cost less than T ) induce the worker to quit into unemployment if z 0 ! R T ðw min Þ and will find it optimal to fire the worker as soon as z 0 \ R T ðw min Þ. In this situation, some separations are privately inefficient as the match surplus is strictly positive at R T ðw min Þ.
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If conversely E½R T ðw min Þ; w min U þ T , then there is scope for the firm and the worker to negotiate a severance package smaller than T that will induce the worker to quit into unemployment. Indeed consider a match where the going wage is wð ! w min Þ and a productivity draw of z 0 ½ ! R T ðw min Þ such that U \ Eðz 0 ; wÞ U þ T and J ðz 0 ; wÞ \ 0. The firm thus incurs losses and would like the worker to leave but the worker is not going to do so spontaneously because Eðz 0 ; wÞ [ U . The compensation it would take to induce the worker to leave is Eðz 0 ; wÞ À U T and the employer's value of inducing a quit is therefore À Eðz 0 ; wÞ þ U ¼ J ðz 0 ; wÞ À ½V ðz 0 Þ À U . Assuming that the firm and the worker can sign an agreement whereby the worker agrees to leave the firm voluntarily with a severance package of Eðz 0 ; wÞ À U , it will be in the parties' joint interest to do so as soon as the productivity shock falls in a range such that V ðz 0 Þ \ U , i.e. falls short of the threshold R S defined by V ðR S Þ ¼ U , such that the match surplus is zero. All separations are privately efficient in this case. 8 1.5.2. Summary of the job destruction rule We use the generic notation D to designate the job destruction threshold, i.e. the level of idiosyncratic productivity below which matches break up. The above developments make it clear that the labour market will be in one of two regimes, with either D ¼ R T ðw min Þ or D ¼ R S . In the former regime, separations may be privately inefficient and directly governed by a binding minimum wage and mandatory severance pay. In the latter regime, all separations are privately efficient given T and w min and the impact of these two policy instruments on the job destruction rate is only indirect (see below). For want of a better denomination, we shall refer to the case D ¼ R T ðw min Þ as the 'inefficient separation regime' and to the case D ¼ R S as the 'efficient separation regime'.
Considerations in the previous paragraph imply that the job destruction threshold D can be generically defined over both regimes as D ¼ max½R T ðw min Þ; R S . Section 2 below establishes formal definitions of R T ðw min Þ and R S , analyses the conditions under which either regime prevails and studies the impact of T and w min under both regimes.
Continuation Values After a Productivity Shock
Given an initial wage of w, we denote the expected values of the match to the firm (the worker, the match) after a shock to productivity as J s ðwÞ( E s ðwÞ, V s ). The generic analytical expressions of those continuation values are somewhat cumbersome (due to the fact that one has to consider different regimes depending on the relative ranking of various productivity thresholds). Fortunately, we do not need to spell them out as the ensuing analysis will only make use of a few relatively simple special cases. At this point, we only bring up the obvious (yet important) remark that these continuation values do not depend on any particular value of z (which immediately follows from the assumption of independent sequential productivity draws).
Bellman Equations
We end our layout of the model by formally writing down the Bellman equations solved by the various value functions defined and used above.
These definitions will be used for derivations below. A series of properties of these functions is established in Appendix B.
Model Solution: The Case of Exogenous Contact Rates
In order to gain some insight about the equilibrium impact of the minimum wage and firing costs on labour market performance, we begin by treating the firm-worker contact rates, k 0 and k 1 , as exogenous parameters. Again, those will be endogenised later on. The purpose of this first step in the analysis is to focus on the partial impact of T and w min on the job separation margin. 
where, in standard fashion, a bar over a cumulative density function (CDF) denotes the corresponding survivor function.
2.1.2. The efficient separation regime: D ¼ R S In the efficient separation regime, the firm and the worker agree to separate when the joint value of the match reaches the value of unemployment:
The formal definition of R S is somewhat more involved than that of D in the inefficient separation regime and we therefore leave it in Appendix C, (C.6)-(C.10). Inspection of those three equations, from which the parameter T is absent, readily confirms the following result by Fella (2007) in our environment -which differs from his by the presence of on-the-job search and wage renegotiation by mutual consent: PROPOSITION 1. In the efficient separation regime, at given firm-worker contact rates k 0 and k 1 , firing costs have no impact on the job destruction threshold, R S .
This result is formally established in Appendix C. The underlying intuition is spelt out in Fella (2007) . If the firing cost is a tax, paid by the firm to a third party, actually paying that tax is in the interest of none of the parties in a joint-surplus-maximising firm-worker match. Now institutions provide firm-worker matches with a way of dodging that tax: because the firing tax only applies to layoffs and not to quits, if the firm's value of the match becomes negative, it will induce a quit by offering the worker a voluntary severance package (equal to the worker's foregone surplus from employment) rather than fire the worker and incur the firing tax. In doing so, the firm effectively turns the firing tax into a transfer to the worker. In the efficient separation regime, the minimum wage is low enough to allow for that transfer to be fully priced out by adjusting the wage over the lifetime of the match. Things are different in the inefficient separation regime, where the minimum wage prevents the firm and the worker from fully pricing out severance packages. In that case, the firing cost, even though it is still turned into a transfer to the worker, has bite.
Conditions Under Which Either Regime Prevails
Given fixed contact rates k 0 and k 1 , which one of the inefficient or efficient separation regime prevails depends on the implemented mix of employment protection, minimum wage and unemployment compensation following a general pattern that we summarise in the ensuing two Propositions.
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PROPOSITION 2. For a given value of the minimum wage w min and the unemployment income b, there exists a cutoff value T c ðw min ; bÞ ! 0 of the statutory redundancy pay (possibly equal to zero) such that the inefficient separation regime prevails for all T T c ðw min ; bÞ while the efficient separation regime prevails for all T [ T c ðw min ; bÞ.
Given the minimum wage and unemployment benefits, the inefficient separation regime tends to prevail under low values of the firing cost. As the firing cost is increased, it becomes increasingly worthwhile for firms to negotiate whatever side payment compensates the worker for quitting into unemployment as match productivity hits low levels in order to avoid paying the full firing cost. Similar results hold for the other two policy tools, w min and b:
PROPOSITION 3. Fix the statutory redundancy pay at T. Then, for a given value of the unemployment income b (the minimum wage w min ), there exists a cutoff value w Again intuitively, given the level of firing costs, the inefficient separation regime tends to prevail under high values of the minimum wage and low values of the unemployment income. As either the minimum wage is reduced or the unemployment benefit level is increased, the gap between the worker's valuations of employment at the minimum wage vis-a-vis unemployment narrows and eventually falls short of the firing cost T, at which point the negotiation of severance packages lower than T at the job destruction margin becomes feasible.
Comparative Statics
We confine our analysis of comparative statics to the inefficient separation regime as firing costs do not affect outcomes in the efficient separation regime. The job destruction condition (5) establishes an equilibrium relationship between D and k 1 , which is parameterised by the policy tools ðT ; w min Þ. It is straightforward to show by differentiation that, given k 1 , firms will adopt a lower D in the face of higher firing costs and a higher D if the minimum wage is raised. Not surprisingly, our model thus confirms the standard qualitative predictions about the response of job destruction behaviour to these specific policy changes. What is more interesting within the context of our model is to look at the interaction between firing costs and on-the-job search (as measured by its intensity k 1 ) in shaping the job destruction rule. The slope of (5) in a ðD; k 1 Þ space turns out to be of ambiguous sign for positive firing costs. Without such costs, a ceteris paribus increase in k 1 unambiguously reduces the firm's valuation of a job (at any productivity level) as it raises both the worker's quit rate and the probability of having to transfer some of the match surplus to the worker in response to an outside job offer, leading the firm to discount the positive option value of the job (shown in the integral term in (5)) more heavily. Without firing costs, a higher k 1 thus clearly leads to an increase in the job destruction threshold D. When firing costs are in place though, the event of the worker quitting is beneficial to the firm in some cases. As we saw in subsection 1.2, any firm incurring losses is indeed happy to let its worker go at a cost lower than T: the opportunity arises when the worker receives an outside offer which s/he will accept, possibly subject to receiving a severance package which is always less than the statutory firing cost T. In short, employed job search provides a channel through which employers can escape job security provisions. And of course, the higher the firing cost, the greater scope there is for this type of situation to arise. As a result, for any positive value of T, the job destruction schedule becomes downward sloping for high values of k 1 .
The flip side of this argument is that employed job search impacts the sensitivity of the job destruction threshold to changes in job security provisions. When faced with an increase in T, firms weigh the cost of hoarding labour to a further extent (by lowering D) against the associated benefit of not having to pay the higher firing cost. More specifically, the direct cost of lowering D is to keep currently less productive jobs occupied, thus incurring greater current losses. This is mitigated by a positive effect of lowering D, which is to increase the job's option value (which accounts for the possibility of the job becoming profitable again in the future). However, on-the-job search weakens this positive option value effect as it makes it more likely that the worker will leave the firm before the job becomes productive again. Therefore the total cost of cutting the job destruction threshold is ceteris paribus higher when employees search more intensely. The immediate benefit of further labour hoarding, on the other hand, is to trade the certainty of having to pay the firing cost now for the possibility of paying it at some future date. But again this latter possibility is less likely to materialise in the presence of on-the-job search, as it may cause the worker to leave the job at no (or little) cost for the firm. Hence the total benefit of labour hoarding also increases with employed job search intensity.
Because both the cost and benefit of reducing the job destruction threshold in the face of an increase in T are higher when employees search more intensely, the net impact of on-the-job search on the responsiveness of D to firing costs is generally ambiguous. For large enough values of T though, labour hoarding becomes the more attractive option when workers are searching on the job and the job destruction threshold will be lower than in the absence of employed job search.
To summarise, in the absence of firing costs, the job destruction threshold will be higher with on-the-job search than without whereas the opposite is true under large enough firing costs. As a consequence, when contrasting an equilibrium with zero firing costs with one with large firing costs, we predict a greater decrease in the job destruction rate when employed job search is allowed.
The Full Model: Endogenous Contact Rates
The analysis so far has kept the firm-worker contact rates ðk 0 ; k 1 Þ exogenous. While it allowed us to preserve some analytical tractability (most of which we shall lose in the rest of this article) and therefore to analyse the impact of policy on the job destruction margin with some degree of generality, it is clearly unsatisfactory from an equilibrium viewpoint as it amounts to shutting down labour demand. We thus now extend the model to allow for endogenous contact rates. In so doing we shall use a matching function, thus continuing to stick to the DMP tradition.
The Matching Process
Search is random and firms advertise new jobs in the knowledge that the pool of job seekers comprises both unemployed and employed workers. As seen above, all employed workers are assumed to engage in on-the-job search. Their search intensity, relative to that of unemployed workers, is denoted s 1 ¼ k 1 =k 0 . We assume the matching technology to exhibit constant returns to scale, which leads to the following expressions for the two job offer rates: k 0 ¼ vh a and k 1 ¼ s 1 k 0 , where h ¼ v=½u þ s 1 ð1 À uÞ denotes labour market tightness. u, 1 À u and v denote the stocks of unemployment, employment and vacancies, respectively, v captures matching efficiency and a denotes the matching elasticity with respect to vacant jobs. The rate at which a firm contacts an unemployed (employed) worker is q 0 ðhÞ [q 1 ðhÞ], defined as follows (we will see shortly that these contacts are not necessarily turned into a match):
Finally, the steady-state unemployment rate follows from a conventional flow-balance condition as u ¼ dF ðDÞ=½dF ðDÞ þ k 0 .
Job Creation
We assume free entry of vacancies in the search market so that the value of a vacant job is zero. Under our maintained assumption that Eð1; w min Þ [ U , unemployed workers accept all job offers made to them as they yield a value that is greater than the value of being unemployed. As seen in subsection 1.3, the optimal offer made to attract an employed worker is to give the worker a value of V(z), where z is the productivity of the worker's old match. The expected profit of a vacancy will thus depend on the distribution of z in filled jobs. We will denote L(Á) the steady-state distribution of productivity in currently filled jobs and derive it as follows by writing the flow balance for the stock of matches with productivity below z, L(z). The flow into L(z) comes from filled matches with productivity higher than z having received a shock lower than z and not been destroyed. The flow rate out of L(z) is due to productivity shocks leading to either job destruction or a surviving match with a productivity higher than z and to outside offers.
LðzÞd½F ðzÞ À F ðDÞ ¼ LðzÞ½d F ðzÞ þ dF ðDÞ þ k 1 ; ð7Þ which implies:
Employed workers accept offers yielding a value (including the severance package if any) greater than the maximum value of employment that their current employer is prepared to offer them. Workers currently employed in a match with a productivity less than z m will be successfully attracted with a wage offer of w min , leaving the advertising firm with a value of the new match of J ð1; w min Þ. Workers currently employed in a match with a productivity z in the range ½z m ; 1 will require a wage offer that yields them a value of V(z) to quit their existing employer (with or without a severance package from that employer, as is detailed above in subsection 1.3). This leaves the advertising firm with a value of the new match of V (1) À V(z). Combining all these facts, we can write the asset price equation for vacant jobs as:
where k denotes advertising costs. Using (8) and integration by parts, we obtain the following job creation condition:
Condition (10) equates the marginal flow cost k of posting a vacancy to the marginal expected flow benefit of doing so. Looking at the expected benefit terms, the first of those reflects the expected benefit from contacting an unemployed worker whereas the second one relates to contacts with already employed workers. The total expected benefit from posting a vacancy decreases with labour market tightness h for the following two reasons. First, the matching rates of vacancies are decreasing functions of h. Second, the expected value of a new hire is negatively related to h as a higher h causes a higher k 1 , thus an increase in the mass of filled jobs at the top productivity z ¼ 1. Besides, the right-hand side of (10) decreases with D as a higher job destruction threshold raises the mean productivity in filled jobs in which productivity is greater than z m . The job creation condition (10) thus defines a negatively-sloped relationship between h and D.
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The level of firing costs T does not affect the relationship between h and ðz m ; DÞ embodied in (10), so increases in T will only affect equilibrium labour market tightness through their impact on the thresholds z m and D. Finally, let us note that, without employed job search, all contacts relating to vacant jobs occur with unemployed workers and that, on average, these leave a larger share of the new match value V(1) to the firm. As the search intensity of the employed, s 1 , increases, the expected benefit of posting a vacancy decreases, so a greater s 1 unambiguously discourages job creation, all other things equal.
Equilibrium: Determination and Comparative Statics
We want to analyse the impact of firing costs T on the equilibrium allocation of our economy. We begin with some formal definitions, leading to the definition of an equilibrium allocation: DEFINITION 1. Equilibrium Allocation. 
(ii) Flow-balance: The formal definition of an equilibrium allocation is complicated by the possibility of two different regimes. In practice, however, part (3 ) of the above definition offers a simple algorithm to determine which regime the economy is in: first, look for both an efficient-separation and an inefficient-separation equilibrium and pick whichever one has the higher job destruction threshold. Details of the derivation of equilibrium are reported in Appendix C.
D, the contact rates, the unemployment rate and the productivity threshold z m are uniquely pinned down by the matching function, the flow-balance condition u ¼ dF ðDÞ=½dF ðDÞ þ k 0 , and the condition V ðz m Þ ¼ Eð1; w min Þ, respectively. Because the job creation and job destruction conditions form a highly non-linear and implicit system, any further formal analysis of existence or uniqueness would be very tedious, and somewhat tangential to our main objective. Existence is not really an issue in applications, where one looks for an equilibrium solution given a set of parameter values. The possibility of multiple equilibria is potentially more of a concern.
13 Yet here again, in applications, we simulate the full non-linear model and we are able to search for equilibrium solutions over the whole domain of admissible values for h and D (i.e. h 2 R þ and D 2 ½0; 1Þ: Multiple equilibria never occurred in any of the calibration exercises that we tried.
We now examine the comparative statics properties of these solutions. Our two policy tools of interest impact job creation in a conventional way: raising either the minimum wage w min or the firing cost T decreases the expected value of the newly created job, decreasing D for given values of h, thus shifting the job creation schedule downwards.
As we saw in subsection 2.3, at given labour market tightness h, the job destruction threshold D decreases with an increase in firing costs T and increases with an increase in the minimum wage w min in the inefficient separation regime. These facts combined with the downward shift of the job creation schedule allow us to predict that an increase in T will result in a decrease in the job destruction threshold D and an ambiguously-signed change in h, while an increase in the minimum wage will result in a drop in labour market tightness h and an ambiguous net change in job destruction. It is difficult to say more analytically about the comparative static properties of our model's equilibrium. The combined effect of policy on job creation and job destruction on equilibrium unemployment is ambiguously signed.
14 We thus now turn to simulations.
Calibration and Comparative Statics
The simulation exercises that we now describe are intended to illustrate the role of onthe-job search in the response of the labour market to changes in firing costs and the minimum wage. As will be seen shortly, this response is markedly different with and without employed job search. 13 As we saw in subsection 2.3, for small values of firing costs T the job destruction rule defines an increasing schedule in the (D, h) space under the inefficient separation regime. This combined with the negative slope of the job creation schedule established in the previous subsection ensures the uniqueness of equilibrium (given existence) when T is small. For larger values of T however, the slope of the inefficient job destruction schedule may become negative, so, if the inefficient regime prevails, this opens the possibility of multiple equilibria arising. Things get even less transparent under the efficient separation regime, where equilibrium is defined by a non-recursive system of three non-linear equations ((C.4), (10) and (5)).
14 Another important property that no longer holds in general under endogenous contact rates is the pattern of regime prevalence described in Propositions 2 and 3. Because k 0 and k 1 both respond to policy changes in equilibrium, the monotonicity properties of the match surplus that were used in the proofs of these Propositions are lost. While any pattern can potentially emerge with endogenous contact rates, the labour market will still behave according to Propositions 2 and 3 in our simulations below. Table 2 reports the values that we assign to the model's parameters and the functional form that we adopt for the sampling distribution of productivity shocks. Flow parameters are expressed in monthly values. We set the annual discount rate to 5%, which translates into the monthly value shown in Table 2 . We assume that productivity shocks occur every three years on average. While this may seem infrequent, we should recall that these shocks capture profound and long-lasting changes to match productivity that have the potential of causing a match breakup. The sampling distribution of match-specific productivity shocks F(Á) is assumed to be uniform over the [0,1] interval. The matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, a is set at 0.2, which lies in the range of estimated values reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) . The parameter relating to advertising costs k is set at 0.2 as in Shimer (2005) and the matching efficiency v is simply calibrated so as to ensure a monthly finding rate consistent with typical UK facts. In order to highlight the contrast between labour market responses to changes in institutions with and without employed job search, we carry out the simulations with two benchmark values of the relative matching efficiency: s 1 ¼ 0 and s 1 ¼ 0:15. The former value yields a labour market without employed job search while the latter value delivers a labour market where about a third of job accessions relate to direct job-to-job moves.
Baseline Simulation
As for our institutions of interest, we set the minimum wage at w min ¼ 0:65 and we allow the firing cost to vary between 0 and 12 months of the maximum productivity. The calibrated value for the minimum wage may seem high and is set at this level to emphasise clearly the role of on-the-job search in a segment of the labour market where the minimum wage is binding. 15 Finally, we set the unemployment income to b ¼ À0.3. Such a low value can be justified if one interprets b as unemployment income net of specific costs incurred by the unemployed (search costs, stigma ...). It is needed to ensure positive match surpluses over a reasonable range of productivity values. This follows from the fact that the job offer arrival rate is much lower for employed (k 1 ) than for unemployed job 
15 In other simulations with lower values of w min (specifically, w min ¼ 0:45, simulations available upon request), we find that the threshold firing cost above which the efficient regime prevails tends to zero (under a month of maximum productivity) when on-the-job search is allowed. By contrast, this threshold stays at just under four months in the environment without employed job search. As a consequence, for a lower value of the minimum wage, raising firing costs beyond one month of maximum productivity ceases to have an impact on unemployment flows and rate in the presence of on-the-job search. When job-to-job turnover is ignored, though, firing costs retain a small impact at this level of minimum wage, whereby the unemployment rate is reduced by 0.7 percentage point when firing costs are raised from zero to four months of maximum productivity. seekers (k 0 ), in line with the findings of Jolivet et al. (2006) . As a result, the option value of unemployed search is much higher than that of employed search. For the surplus to be positive in a match with relatively low productivity, the flow income in unemployment needs to be much smaller than the flow income for the worker in such a match. Figure 1 shows the response of various basic labour market indicators to a variation in the statutory dismissal cost T (x-axis, expressed in months of match output at maximum productivity z ¼ 1), under both values of the relative matching efficiency for the employed detailed above. We predict monthly job destruction rates of around 1.5% and a job finding rate for the unemployed of about 18%, which yields a predicted unemployment rate of around 7.5%, all in line with typical UK figures.
The Impact of Firing Costs

Job creation and job destruction under both regimes
What is immediately striking in Figure 1 is the obvious regime switch occurring at a value of T equal to 4-5 months of the maximum productivity. In spite of contact rates being endogenous in the simulations, the market clearly behaves as described in Propositions 2 and 3: for a given value of w min , the inefficient separation regime prevails at relatively low values of T, while the market stays in the efficient separation regime for a redundancy pay beyond a certain size. Note that the threshold between the two regimes is lower in the presence of employed job search, so that a market where employed workers' search intensity is greater will be more likely to be in the efficient separation regime, for a given level of the institution mix of T and w min . Under the inefficient separation regime and in the absence of employed job search, the qualitative predictions of our model regarding the impact of statutory firing costs on job destruction and job creation rates are standard. Higher firing costs slow down both of these, unambiguously reducing unemployment flows but having a small and ambiguously-signed net effect on the unemployment rate. In fact, this effect turns out to be slightly positive in this simulation. By contrast, with on-the-job search, we observe a much sharper decline of the job destruction rate as severance pay increases, as was predicted in Section 2. From a quantitative standpoint, the impact of T on job destruction is magnified by the presence of on-the-job search, thus suggesting that the firing-tax avoidance effect of employed job search is quantitatively more important than the discount effect on the option value (see the discussion in subsection 2.3). The picture relating to the unemployed job finding rate also shows a sharp difference with the simulated results obtained without on-the-job search: increases in severance pay have hardly any impact on the job finding rate when employed job search is allowed. This difference in responsiveness of job creation to variations in T comes from the steeper response of the job destruction threshold D to changes in firing costs when employed job search is present. Indeed, a decrease in D renders a contact made with an employed worker more attractive in expectation terms as it shifts the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity in filled jobs to the left. In other words, it increases the probability that an advertising employer will only have to offer V ðz m Þ to attract an employed worker upon meeting one (and decreases the probability of being left with a zero share of the match value, i.e. of making contact with an employed worker in an existing match with maximum idiosyncratic productivity z ¼ 1). As a consequence, the overall impact of increases in firing costs on the unemployment rate is much more marked than with than without on-the-job search as the substantial decrease displayed in the bottom-left panel of Figure 1 illustrates. Increasing the statutory severance pay from zero to five months' maximum productivity is predicted to cut the unemployment rate by slightly over 1.5 percentage point.
This, however, only relates to an economy in the inefficient separation regime. As is obvious from Figure 1 , things change dramatically as the economy enters the efficient separation regime, at which point firing costs cease to have any impact at all.
Job-to-job reallocation
The job-to-job switching rate increases as statutory firing costs are raised. The job switching rate equals the job offer arrival rate k 1 times the probability that the typical outside offer be accepted by its recipient,
As the arrival rate of offers is virtually unaffected by firing costs and D decreases markedly, the overall impact is an increase in the job-to-job turnover rate. This combined with the fact that the unemployment rate decreases with T implies that total job-to-job reallocation increases while unemployment flows decrease, so that the share of worker reallocation due to direct job-to-job moves increases markedly with increases in T, as illustrated in the bottom-right panel of Figure 1 . This is consistent with the prediction that job security provisions 'redistribute employment opportunities from unemployed to employed workers' (Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2004) . It also matches empirical evidence gathered by Boeri (1999) , who reports shares of job-to-job reallocation within total labour reallocation for a sample of OECD (mostly European) countries in the range of 30%-50% and increasing with the tightness of employment legislation.
Conclusion
Adding on-the-job search and negotiation over severance packages alters the quantitative predictions of the standard DMP model markedly without employed job search regarding the impact of firing costs on employment flows and the unemployment rate. In our simulations, increasing the firing costs from zero to five months of the maximum productivity reduces the unemployment rate by one and a half percentage points, whereas a typical calibration of the DMP model without onthe-job search would predict an ambiguous and quantitatively negligible effect on the unemployment rate. Furthermore, past a certain level of firing costs, further increases in said costs become marginally ineffective, as in Fella (2007) . This occurs because, as firing costs are increased beyond a threshold, it becomes profitable for firms to induce workers to quit into unemployment by offering suitable compensation. That threshold is an increasing function of the minimum wage, so that firing costs are less likely to impact unemployment when the minimum wage is high. This concurs with arguments made in Garibaldi and Violante (1998) or Cahuc and Zylberberg (1999) , whereby the degree of wage rigidity is a key determinant of the effectiveness of firing restrictions policies.
The main distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we take into account the possibility of on-the-job search and job-to-job quits. The role that job quitters play in our framework becomes important in situations where the firm incurs losses (in the presence of firing restrictions), poaching firms are constrained in the offers they can make (in the presence of a wage floor) and the incumbent firm and worker pair are able to negotiate over the amount of a severance package (under the mutual consent rule). We argue that the extent of job-to-job reallocation is a key feature of the economy's response to a change in the policy choice in terms of combined firing cost and minimum wage. Of course, it may be that firing costs also impact on employed search intensity if, for example, only tenured employees are entitled to job protection. This feedback channel is not explored in this article and is a possible avenue of extension of this research.
A.1. Renegotiation Following a Productivity Shock
Consider an ongoing match drawing a new productivity shock x, which, given the wage w inherited from previous periods, yields values of E and J to the worker and the firm, respectively. These values are known to both parties. The game represented in extensive form in Figure A1 ensues. Following the occurrence of a productivity shock, the worker has no outside offer in hand, so his outside option is to quit into unemployment, which has value U. For the firm, the outside option is worth ÀT if the firm has to lay off the worker to exit the relationship, as the value of holding a vacant job is zero. If the worker quits, the firm's value is zero as it is not paying the firing cost. In our initial description of the renegotiation game in Figure A1 we ignore the minimum wage, which we will reintroduce at a later stage.
Each party has the opportunity to prompt a negotiation. A key aspect of the game is that, in the event of a party prompting negotiation, the other party gets one single chance to respond. The worker has the first move, and triggering negotiation for the worker means quitting the match (node 1 in Figure A1 ). For the firm it can mean laying off the worker or offering them an agreed separation with a side-payment s to be determined in equilibrium (node 2.2).
If the worker announces a quit, the firm's response (node 2.1) is either to let him do so (leading to node 3.2) or to try and retain him (leading to node 3.1), which will be achieved by offering a wage increase yielding the worker a value of employment in the current match of U + e, where e is an arbitrarily small, strictly positive number. At node 3.1, the worker simply accepts or rejects the firm's new offer.
If the worker does not threaten to quit the job, the firm can do one of three things (node 2.2): do nothing (leading to status quo payoffs: node 3.3); offer a severance package s (leading to node 3.4) or layoff the worker (leading to node 3.5). If the firm offers a severance package (node 3.4), the worker may either accept or reject the offer. In the latter case, status quo prevails and the firm does not get another chance to layoff in this round of negotiation (the game ends at node 4.4). Finally, when faced with the threat of a layoff (node 3.5), the worker may of course do nothing and accept being laid off (leading to node 4.5), but he also gets a chance to respond by either offering a severance deal (leading to node 4.6) which the firm subsequently accepts or rejects, or by offering to take a wage cut and continue the relationship (leading to node 4.7) which the firm subsequently accepts or rejects.
The game is solved in standard fashion by backward induction and we skip the details of the solution (available on request). Equilibrium strategies as well as the equilibrium value of the severance package s offered by the firm at node 2.2 depend on initial match values E and J and their position relative to the parties' outside option payoffs. When the firm offers an agreed separation (implying the worker quitting with a severance package s and the firm not having to pay the layoff tax T ), the worker may reject it if his value of staying in the match with the status quo, E, is greater than the value of leaving with the severance package, U + s. Thus the minimum package s that the firm has to offer for the worker to accept it depends on the worker's current value of employment E. If E U, then a severance package of e is enough to induce the worker to leave the match. If E > U, a severance pay of E À U + e is just enough for the worker to strictly prefer the agreed separation to the status quo. Note, however, that the firm will never offer a severance package in excess of T as this is the amount it would need to pay for a layoff. So s is capped at T. The relationship between the required s and E is summarised as:
Given those values of s, Table A1 summarises equilibrium play and payoffs for a continuing firm-worker match hit by a productivity shock, in all possible cases regarding initial match values. Table A1 Equilibrium Play and Payoffs After a Productivity Shock A.1.1. Binding minimum wage
As mentioned above, the results in Table A1 were obtained under the assumption of no binding minimum wage, so that a worker's wage may be low enough to make unemployment preferable to employment at that wage, for a given productivity value x. In that case, the worker either quits or agrees to a separation with an infinitesimal severance pay if the match becomes unprofitable (bottom row of Table A1 ) and the worker is able to claim a pay raise by credibly threatening to quit into unemployment if the match is still profitable (second row of the top panel of Table A1 ). Those cases may be ruled out in the presence of a minimum wage that prevents the worker's wage from dropping low enough to equate E to U. Also in the presence of a minimum wage, the wage may not be allowed to drop enough to reduce the firm's losses to ÀT + e (top row of Table A1 , when firm's losses exceed T and the worker prefers to stay in employment, V > U). In the notation introduced in the main text, this happens when the new productivity draw, x, falls short of R T ðw min Þ. In that case, the match is dissolved (even though it has positive surplus, V > U), and an agreed separation occurs with a side payment of s ¼ min{E À U + e,T}.
A.1.2. If T is a transfer
When T is a tax, the sum of payoffs upon an agreed separation is U whereas it is only U À T if a layoff goes ahead. Hence it is always jointly profitable to agree on a severance deal rather than resort to a layoff and layoffs never occur in equilibrium (Fella, 2007) . On the other hand, if T is a transfer, the sum of payoffs upon separation is always U, be it a layoff or a separation. Layoffs are no longer jointly inefficient and occur in some cases. This is the only substantive change to equilibrium brought about by assuming that T is a transfer from the firm to the worker rather than a tax.
Suppose that T is now paid directly from the firm to the worker upon layoff. The only things that change in Figure A1 are the payoffs in case of a layoff, i.e. at nodes 4.5, 5.2 and 5.4. If T is a transfer, the worker receives U + T rather than U at all three of those nodes. Solution of the game by backward induction, however, reveals that the payoffs reported in Table A1 still apply in the case where the firing cost is a transfer. The only difference to the case where T is a tax is that, at node 4.6, the worker now rejects the severance deal offered by the firm and gets laid off, receiving a payoff of U + T instead of U + T À e. So when T is a transfer, a fraction of the separations are now labelled as layoffs, as opposed to all separations being agreed on in the case where T is a tax. Apart from that, equilibrium strategies and payoffs are the same in both cases.
A.2. Renegotiation Following an Outside Job Offer
Consider an ongoing match with productivity z and wage w (yielding values of E and J to the worker and the firm, respectively) in which the worker receives an outside offer with value E 0 .
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All of those values are known to both parties. The game represented in extensive form in Figure  A2 ensues. Apart from the fact that the worker's outside option is now to accept the outside offer, which has value E 0 [ U , the game is identical to the one that is played when renegotiating after a productivity shock ( Figure A1 ). Also in Figure A2 , the branch of the game starting at node 2.2 with the firm laying off the worker was deliberately omitted, as it is never played in equilibrium. Indeed, unless an adverse productivity shock occurs, it cannot be optimal for the firm to fire the worker (otherwise the firm would have done so already).
Once again, the game in Figure A2 is solved by backward induction. Equilibrium payoffs and the implied optimal value E 0 of the poacher's offer are discussed in the main text (Table 1 ). Formal details of the game's solution are available on request.
Appendix B: Properties of the Value Functions
In this Appendix, we establish a set of properties of the value functions defined in (1)-(4) that will be useful for the rest of the analysis.
B.1. Derivatives and Monotonicity
From Table 1 , we know that V o ðzÞ ¼ max½V ðzÞ; V ðz m Þ where, from (3):
ðB:1Þ
The combination of Table 1 and the value of V 0 ðÁÞ just derived allows us to express the partial derivatives ð@ E o =@z; @ J o =@zÞ as reported in Table B1 . Expressions for the partial derivatives (@E/@z;@J/@z) then follow from the Bellman equations (1)-(4). The various cases are covered in Table B2 . An important property derived from Table B2 is that the workers' valuation of a job, E(Á), is independent of match productivity z whenever the latter is less than z m .
B.2. Ranking of Various Productivity Thresholds
The following ranking of some important productivity thresholds will be used in subsequent developments.
LEMMA 1. R T ðw min Þ \ R 0 ðw min Þ \ z m 1 and R S \ R 0 ðw min Þ.
Proof. In the first series of inequalities, the last inequality is almost by definition as V ð1Þ [ Eð1; w min Þ ¼ V ðz m Þ (the inequality there holds true because otherwise there would be no trade on the labour market). Then, because E(Á) is increasing in z over ½z m ; 1 (see Table B2 ), we have that Eðz m ; w min Þ \ Eð1; w min Þ ¼ V ðz m Þ. Hence J ðz m ; w min Þ ¼ V ðz m Þ À Eðz m ; w min Þ [ 0, which proves that a firm paying the minimum wage in a match with productivity z m makes a profit, hence R 0 ðw min Þ \ z m (the second inequality). The first inequality R T ðw min Þ \ R 0 ðw min Þ is a direct consequence of @J/@z being positive throughout. Now turning to the second claim R S \ R 0 ðw min Þ, we have that J ðR S ; w min Þ ¼ V ðR S Þ À EðR S ; w min Þ ¼ U À EðR S ; w min Þ (by the definition of R S ). This last term is negative by assumption (as workers are never willing to quit into unemployment).
